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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
The appellant, Robert Lee Dixon, was convicted
in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, of the crime of the distribution of
a controlled substance for value in violation of Utah Code
Ann., § 58-37-8 (1953).

The Honorable James S. Sawaya,

Judge, presided.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant was found guilty by the jury of the
crime of the distribution of a controlled substance for
value and was sentenced on December 16, 1975, by the
Honorable Judge James S. Sawaya, to the Utah State Prison
for an indefinite term not to exceed fifteen years.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks an order of this court reversing
the judgment rendered by the trial court and a ruling
remanding the case to the trial court for a new trial*

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant-appellant was tried on the charge
of the distribution of a controlled substance for value on
December 8, 1975, in Salt Lake County, Utah,
The witnesses for the prosecution were two Salt
Lake City policemen, Michael Roberts and Kenneth L. Thirsk,
and a former heroin addict, Denise Giertz, who was working
as an undercover operative for the police.
Sixteen potential jurors were called and sworn.
(T. 3)

The prosecution passed the panel for cause.

(T. 19)

The defense counsel, Mr. Beasley, requested leave and was
granted the right to reserve any challenges for cause until
after the impaneling process.

(T. 19)

The defense counsel

and the prosecution each used their four pre-emptory challen
The remaining eight jurors were sworn to try the case.
Following the prosecutor's opening statement, Mr.
Beasley, for the defense, challenged for cause four members
of the jury panel on the grounds that they all had served

|

on prior jury panels where identical witnesses and the same
identical charge and verdicts of guilty had been returned.
(T. 23) The motion was denied by the court.

|
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The police officers and Ms. Giertz testified for
the state. The defendant testified for the defense. There
were no other witnesses or evidence.

The only two persons

who allegedly participated in the unlawful transaction
were Ms. Giertz for the prosecution and Mr. Dixon, the
defendant.

(T. 97)

Officer Roberts testified for the prosecution
that he drove Ms. Giertz to the vicinity of the West Side
Motel, that she left the car on foot and returned ten
minutes later with a balloon of heroin in her mouth.

(T. 52)

Ms. Giertz testified that she walked to the West
Side Motel and entered by herself.

She met the defendant

inside the Motel and began talking with him.

(T. 38) She

stated that she bought for $40.00 a balloon of heroin from
him at this time.

(T. 40)

Placing the balloon in her

mouth, she left the motel and returned to the police car.
(T. 40)
The defendant, Robert Lee Dixon, was called as
a witness in his own behalf and denied the occurrence of
both the alleged conversation and the sale of heroin to
Ms. Giertz.

(T. 144)

He further stated that his last

conviction occurred in 1967.

(T. 143)

ARGUMENT
POINT I:

WHERE THE SOLE DEFENSIVE MATTER IS AN ATTACK
ON THE CREDIBILITY OF THE STATE'S WITNESSES,
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S
CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE OF FOUR JURORS WHO HAD
SERVED ON FOUR PREVIOUS JURYS RENDERING
GUILTY VERDICTS IN WHICH THE SAME STATE'S
WITNESSES HAD TESTIFIED AND BEEN FOUND
CREDIBLE.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-30-19(5) (1953) provides
a challenge for cause for implied bias of a potential
juror if the prospective juror:
(5) (Has) served on a trial jury which
has tried another person for the offense
charged.
One possible construction of the above statutory language is that a juror is not disqualified to serve
on a criminal case merely because he had theretofore
served on a jury which tried another defendant of a
like offense arising out of a separate and distinct
transaction from that in the pending case, and having
no connection therewith other than the similarity in
the violation of the crime charged.
States, 4 F.2d 884 (1925).

Haussener v. United

In Haussener, the defendants

were convicted of unlawful sales of intoxicating liquor.
Five of the jurors who served in this case had previously
sat in other cases, against other persons, charged with
some violation of the Volstead Act, wherein one or both
of the government prohibition agents testifying had been

i

the only witnesses in the other cases. On voir dire,
it was apparent that some of the jurors had formed and
still had a certain opinion as to the credibility of the
prohibition agents.

The court held that the five jurors

should not be disqualified giving two reasons in support
of it's decision.

First, the court stated that the

defendant's challenge for cause as to these five jurors
would be denied because the only challenge made was to
the whole array of the jury, as impaneled, and this was
an insufficient challenge.

Second, the court stated

that impaneling a jury composed of persons who had never
before heard the testimony of the two prohibition agents
would so impede the court's business as to make the
enforcement of the Volstead Act difficult.
at 886.

Haussener

Clearly, the Haussener court was attaching

more importance to the court's efforts to save time than
the defendant's constitutional right to an impartial
jury.

Addressing this subject, Judge Merrimon said:
The great importance of trial by
jury is sometimes lost sight of, even in
courts of justice, in the disposition of
petty misdemeanors, cases of no great
moment, and what are called "plain cases."
In the economy of time, the hurry of
business, lack of attention, and hasty
consideration, irregular and unwarranted
methods of trial are adopted, allowed,
and tolerated, and thus vicious practices
spring up, creating sources of danger to
constitutional right....State v. Holt,
90 N.C. 749, 751, 47 Am.R. 554, 546-7
(1884).

Judge Merrimon was restating one of the basic premises
of legal justice.

The court's efforts to economize

time, no matter how virtuous, should not be the overriding consideration of any case, particularly when
these efforts operate to deprive a defendant of his
constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury.
Both the Constitution of the United States
and the Utah Constitution provide to an accused the
right to an impartial jury.

The Constitution of the

United States reads in pertinent part as follows:
In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of
the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed....U.S. CONST,
amend. VI.
The Utah Constitution reads in pertinent part as follows:
In criminal prosecutions the
accused shall have the right....to have
a speedy public trial by an impartial
jury of the county or district in which
the offense is alleged to have been
committed
UTAH CONST, art. 1, § 12.
The jury bias statutes were written to assist the
State in its efforts to insure that every defendant receives
an impartial jury.

Therefore, the preferred statutory

construction is that which is harmonious with the
constitutional prescription for an impartial jury.

To

meet this need for harmony, many state courts give the
broadest possible construction to their statutes on
jury selection and jury bias.

Montana is one of these

states and it's statute on jury bias is identical to
the Utah statute under discussion.

The statute is used

as a collection of suggested exceptions; it is not
regarded as a complete and exhaustive list.

*

The constitutional right to a trial
by an impartial jury is an unqualified
one....It is beyond the power of the
legislature to curtail the right, and
therefore the provisions of the statutes
which relate to the selection of a jury
are to be understood as merely providing
the means by which the constitutional
guaranty may be exercised to the fullest
extent. State v. Brooks, 57 Mont. 480,
188 P. 942/943 (1920). See also State
v. Russell, 73 Mont. 240, 235 P. 712
(1925) .

Brooks involved a defendant who was convicted of the
crime of sedition in obstructing the national Selective
Draft Law.

The defendant exhausted his pre-emptory

challenges on jurors he had previously challenged for
cause which challenges for cause were denied.

The lower

court stated that the facts of the case did not bring
the jurors1 bias within any of Montana's statutory
exceptions.

On appeal, the court ordered a new trial

stating that the right to an impartial jury is an
unqualified right and that the Montana legislature could
not limit that right.
Other courts, preferring to work within the
framework of the statutory language, have held that in
criminal cases when the facts are such that an accused
would be denied an impartial jury, that the statute

should be construed to read that a juror is disqualified
to serve on a case when he has previously served on a
jury which tried and convicted another defendant for a
similar but independent offense and the same state's
witnesses testified.

Priestly v. State, 19 Ariz. 371f

171 P. 137 (1918); Roberts v. Statef 4 Ga.App. 378,
61 S.E. 497 (1908); and Popp v. State, 44 Okla.Crim.
220, 280 P. 478 (1929).
In Priestly, the defendant was convicted of
selling intoxicating liquors and appealed on the ground
that he was not accorded a fair and impartial trial. The
jury panel contained five men who had rendered a guilty
verdict against a different defendant on a similar but
independent charge.

The state's witnesses in both cases

were three detectives who corroborated one another's
testimony.

The sole defensive matter was an attack on

the incredibility of the three detectives.

The defendant's

challenges for cause of these five jurors was overruled
and, after having exhausted his four pre-emptory challenges, the defense was forced to accept on the impaneled
jury a portion of those five male jurors. The court said:
These objectionable jurors are no
doubt good men and representative citizens,
perfectly conscientious in the belief they
expressed of an ability to be indifferent
between the state and the defendant, notwithstanding the knowledge they had obtained
of the facts and witnesses in a court of
justice where they had sat as jurors and
given their verdict. So, too, the action

of the learned trial judge (in overruling
the objection), we are persuaded, was
dictated by a proper sense of propriety
and decorum. But the weakness and error
in the ruling lay in the trial judge
having that confidence in the ability of
the jurors to be entirely impartial under
the circumstances, which confidence the
jurors had expressed, each in himself.
Having passed upon the credibility of
witnesses in a similar case, upon substantially the same testimony, and having
theretofore rendered a verdict on their
oaths, it is not to be believed that they
could sit upon this case with such an
opinion previously formed without it
influencing their action." Priestly at
139.
Accordingly, the court held that the defendant was denied
his constitutional right to a trial by an impartial jury.
In another case similar to the one at bar,
the defendant was convicted of selling intoxicating
liquor.

Popp, supra.

The record showed that just pre-

ceeding the trial of this case, the mother of the defendant
had been tried by a jury on a like charge which returned
a verdict finding her guilty.

The two state witnesses

in this case were the only two used against the mother.
The Popp court held that where certain jurors called for
the trial of the defendant had just served in the trial
of the mother on a like charge and where the witnesses
in the cases were largely the same and the fairness and
impartiality of the jurors for this reason was called
into question, such jurors were not impartial within the
meaning of the Constitution of the United States or of
the Constitution of Oklahoma.

The facts of the Roberts case, supra, closely
parallel those of the case at bar.

In Roberts, the

state used the same witness in three successive and
similar trials.

The credibility of this sole witness

had been unsuccessfully attacked in the two previous
trials.

Th£ only parties to the alleged incident were

the defendant and the state's sole witness.
Whether this sole witness to the
criminal act charged against the defendant
was worthy of credit was vital to the
defense of the accused. If the jurors
believed this witness, they would convict
the accused; if they did not believe him,
they would acquit. If they had believed
him notwithstanding the attack made upon
credit in the two former cases, it is
certainly reasonable to presume that they
would also believe him when a similar
attack was made upon his credit by the
defendant in the present case. At least,
the jury who had tried the other two
cases would come to the consideration of
the present case entertaining an opinion
that the sole witness against the defendant
was worthy of credit. The defendant would
therefore have the burden of combating a
preconceived judgment or opinion formed
by the jurors as to a most material fact
in the case. Roberts at 498.
Tlie

Roberts court held that a previous judgment or opinion

as to the credibility of a single witness against the
defendant, expressed by the verdicts in two other cases,
should disqualify the juror.

See also Bowens v. State,

116 Ga.App. 577, 158 S.E. 420 (1967).
The case at bar, as in Priestly, supra, Popp,
supra, and Roberts, supra, had as its sole defense an

attack on the credibility of the state's witnesses. Two
of the three witnesses merely attempted to corroborate
the testimony of the third, Denise Giertz. But the only
two witnesses to the alleged sale of heroin were Denise
Giertz and the defendant.

Denise Giertz and the two

corroborating policemen were found credible in four prior
trials in which four other defendants were tried and convicted on similar but independent offenses. Whether
Denise Giertzf testimony against the defendant was worthy
of credit was vital to the defense.

If the jurors

believed her, they would convict; if they did not believe
her, they would acquit.

Ms. Giertz1 credibility was a

most material fact in the case.

If her credibility had

withstood four previous attacks by defease counsels, it
was reasonable to presume that a fifth attack would likewise be frustrated.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, there are several ways to construe
the Utah statute under discussion.

The method applied in

Haussener, supra, restricts the statutory exceptions to
those enumerated in the statute.

If a defendant's chal-

lange for cause of a juror is legitimate but doesn't fit
within one of the statutory exceptions, his right to an
impartial jury is denied.
The two other methods attempt to harmonize
state jury selection statutes with the right to an

impartial jury as provided for in the state constitutions
and the Constitution of the United States.
Montana exemplified one approach wherein the
courts have explicitly held that the legislature may not
limit this unqualifiable right to an impartial jury.
The statute is used as a collection of suggested exceptions
rather than as an exhaustive list.
Most other states work within the framework of
the statutory language but do not qualify the defendant's
right to an impartial jury even if the challenge for
cause does not neatly fit into one of the exceptions.
These states construe the statutory language to mean
that a potential juror is disqualified for implied bias
if he has served in trials of other defendants wherein
the offenses were similar but independentf and where
the same state's witnesses had testified and been found
credible and the jury subsequently returned guilty verdicts.

Priestly, supra, Popp, supra, and Roberts, supra.

These states recognize that this particular combination
of facts denies to a defendant his right to an impartial
jury unless the challenged jurors are disqualified.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-3-0-19(5) (1953) should be
broadly construed to permit the disqualification of the
four jury members challenged for cause for implied bias.
Such a construction is consistent with Mr. Dixon's
constitutional right to an impartial jury.

